How are we to decide what to do with our time in a moral sense? What guides us? How do we know?

How are we to decide what to do with our time in a moral sense? What guides us? How do we know?

A friend of mine who I admire quite deeply brought up a simple question about moral epistemology. How do we know we are doing right and how do we discern from whom we should be guided? He writes, "I have zero way to verify if what they’re telling me is actually the true will of the invisible judge." Now, I'm sure some would simply respond "read the scripture", but that begs the question in favor of a particular scripture. One would need to first come to a belief in the scripture, but even then the variety of interpretations may be a hindrance. However, I think there is a path forward, guided by our current position in our faith journey, that can be reasonably agreed upon. People should only be held accountable for what they are able to do.If there is a best or set of best possible things a person can do,

he or she should do it.We can conceive of the best possible thing we are able do with our time (in the next 5 minutes, 10 minutes, hour, etc.)We ought to do the best possible thing of which we can conceive. Unfortunately, this leads to a difficult if not depressing conclusion. None of us really takes the time to think, "what is the best possible thing I can do in the next hour" and then actually does it. We always live our lives not only below what a perfect being might desire of us, but below what we know we are capable of. I think this ultimately sheds light on the depravity of humanity. We constantly choose short term marginal pleasure (a better coffee, a new video game, another drink at the bar) over maximal relief (charity for those in dire straits). I am doing this now in writing this post.

This is another common objection raised by non-theists. It is a complex question but one that I think is best answered with Molinism

Do we still have free will if God knows our future?

First, let me begin by saying that Molinism is unnecessary to solve this problem. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an exceptional article explaining how arguments which attempt to show a contradiction between free will and divine foreknowledge commit a fallacy in modal logic. However, this is quite technical and can be difficult for many to follow. It was for me until I really dug down and worked with modal logic and its symbolic form. I think there is an easier explanation if one takes Molinism to be true. Briefly, Molinism is the belief that God's omniscience includes knowledge of "subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom". What are "subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom"? Well, they look something like this... If Sally would go to the party tonight, then she would freely choose to drink too much.If Johnny sees the car wreck, then he would freely choose to run to save the victims Basically, it is a claim that if a person were

in some situation, they would freely behave in one way or another. This type of knowledge is also called "Middle Knowledge" as it is neither God's natural knowledge (mathematical and logical truths, for example) which he possesses before creation, nor his free knowledge of the creation he manifests. Rather, it sits between these two types of knowledge. Now, I will not get into arguments here as to whether Middle Knowledge exists. While I wouldn't say that it is terribly controversial, it is disputed. So, how does Middle Knowledge or Molinism answer this question about Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will? Well, one could imagine God could create an infinite number of possible universes. However, God desires to choose universes that have free will, since free will is essential to moral significance (if we don't have free will, then there is no moral responsibility, we are just glorified puppets). Let's delineate all worlds from those that have free will as possible…

One of the more common critiques of Christian theology is the Doctrine of Original Sin. The position that we are born guilty seems intuitively unfair. However, I intend to show that any robust moral realist position entails some form of intrinsic sinfulness of humans. That is to say, if there are real moral values and duties, regardless of how you ground them, then all persons violate, at least to a modest degree, those norms.

Are we really born with sin? How can this possibly be fair? It turns out that this isn't just a problem for Original Sin, it is a problem for morality in general.

A few assumptions are required for this argument: Moral values and duties are real.People are not responsible for events outside their control.There is sufficient human freedom to make moral decisions. Imagine for a moment that two men are independently planning to mug someone. One set his alarm clock for 8:00AM and the other for 8:05AM. The early riser of the two men sets out to find a victim, but discovers it is just too early in the morning to find a victim. However, at 8:02AM, an innocent bystander strolls out of his apartment where he finds himself between the two would-be muggers. Since the first mugger has passed, he does not notice the innocent man. The second mugger, though, proceeds to strike the innocent man and steal his wallet. On moral realism, we would likely agree that the successful mugger has commited a serious wrong in injuring and robbing the innocent man. We would also likely agree that the first

man who intended to assault and rob an innocent individual has committed a wrong, although perhaps not as serious. His intent to violate moral norms is itself a violation of those norms. We recognize this widely in legal systems today as "conspiracy" to commit a crime is itself a crime. Now, imagine that the second mugger (the one who successfully commited the crime) had lucked upon a winning lottery ticket on the ground with a cash value $2500. This amount of money was sufficient for him to not consider mugging anyone, despite having done nothing to earn the money. Here is the pivotal question. Is the first attempted mugger, whose motivation was financial, worse than the second successful mugger given this new scenario, even though all that has changed is the circumstances and nothing about the persons themselves? We know that had he not stumbled upon the $2500, he would have intended to and followed through with mugging. Are we…