An argument proposed by atheist philosopher Sobel. He outlines this argument as follows. P1. This is not the best possible world.P2. That the world is not the best possible world is incompatible with a perfect being.C. There does not exist a perfect being. I would like to focus on Premise 2 of this argument because it is also an important part of standard formulations of the Problem of Evil. Is a Perfect World a Coherent Concept? Let's start with a thought experiment. Imagine there is a perfect baker who can create any cake that is good and no cake that is bad. He has been tasked with creating cakes to commemorate several different events in a single day. The first event is a wedding, the second is a birthday, the third is a graduation and the fourth is a funeral. If there were a single, perfect cake, then the baker could create a single cake that would perfectly satisfy all

attendees. But is this conceivable? Isn't part of what makes a cake valuable to the celebrants the uniqueness of the cake, the cake being specific and personalized. Does the existence of a cake that is not perfect for their occasion but perfect for another mean that the baker is imperfect (he did, after all, create an imperfect cake with respect to the preferences of 3/4 parties)? It seems to me that the perfect baker would create cakes that are appropriate for each occasion. But we can take this even further... Is the Perfection of which Sobel Speaks an Objective or Subjective Perfection? Imagine again the perfect baker. Today he is tasked with merely creating a single cake for a wedding. Is it reasonable to think that the perfect baker can create a cake that satisfies to perfection the appetites of all of the attendees? It seems that this request is reasonable iff the preferences of all attendees is compatible. I…

This is another common objection raised by non-theists. It is a complex question but one that I think is best answered with Molinism

Do we still have free will if God knows our future?

First, let me begin by saying that Molinism is unnecessary to solve this problem. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an exceptional article explaining how arguments which attempt to show a contradiction between free will and divine foreknowledge commit a fallacy in modal logic. However, this is quite technical and can be difficult for many to follow. It was for me until I really dug down and worked with modal logic and its symbolic form. I think there is an easier explanation if one takes Molinism to be true. Briefly, Molinism is the belief that God's omniscience includes knowledge of "subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom". What are "subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom"? Well, they look something like this... If Sally would go to the party tonight, then she would freely choose to drink too much.If Johnny sees the car wreck, then he would freely choose to run to save the victims Basically, it is a claim that if a person were

in some situation, they would freely behave in one way or another. This type of knowledge is also called "Middle Knowledge" as it is neither God's natural knowledge (mathematical and logical truths, for example) which he possesses before creation, nor his free knowledge of the creation he manifests. Rather, it sits between these two types of knowledge. Now, I will not get into arguments here as to whether Middle Knowledge exists. While I wouldn't say that it is terribly controversial, it is disputed. So, how does Middle Knowledge or Molinism answer this question about Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will? Well, one could imagine God could create an infinite number of possible universes. However, God desires to choose universes that have free will, since free will is essential to moral significance (if we don't have free will, then there is no moral responsibility, we are just glorified puppets). Let's delineate all worlds from those that have free will as possible…

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